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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

CONTRACTS TO MAKE WILLS IN PENNSYLVANIA
By
A. J. WHITE HuTrToN1
It is trite law that a will is revocable and has no binding effect until
probated after death of the maker. So, a will has been called an ambulatory instrument until death. An able writer has thus defined a will:
"A will is the legally enforceable declaration of a person's intention of what he desires to be done after his death, which declaration is
revocable during his lifetime, and is operative for no purpose until death,
and is applicable to the situation which exists at the maker's decease." 1
In Re Gredler's Estate,2 Stern, J., however, thus asserts:
"It is well established that an agreement to make a will or to devise
one's property to a particular person or for a particular purpose is binding and irrevocable when supported by what the law regards as valid consideration."
Consequently, in Pennsylvania the doctrine of irrevocability of wills has been
established. Thirty odd years ago in McGinley's Estate Mestrezat, J. declared:
"It is well settled that one may enter into a valid contract to dispose
by will of his property, real or personal, in a particular way, and that
such will is irrevocable and the contract will be specifically enforced."
Incongruity

When it is said that a will is a revocable instrument and does not become
fixed until the death of the maker but later one finds that the courts have declared
a will may be irrevocable, the two statements appear incongruous and irreconcilable. However, the inconsistence is more apparent than real. What is actually meant
is that a will per se is always revocable but if it is also a contract or part of a
contract, the testamentary characteristic presents one phase of law and the contractual feature shows another phase of the same general situation.
Again, theories sometimes become confused with actualities in matters of
procedure and remedies. A court may determine that the will as a testamentary
disposition is revocable but notwithstanding may later hold the same enforceable
as a contractual obligation. In Pennsylvania, the courts have viewed the problem
realistically by declaring that a will is irrevocable under certain circumstances.
In Cawley's Estate' after explaining the difference between a contract and a
will, pointing out that the former carries an obligation and the right to require per1 ATKINSON ON WILLS, page 1 (1937), citing other definitions. Cf. Re Douglas' Estate, 303
Pa. 227, 154 A. 376 (1931).
9 361 Pa. 384, 65 A.2d 404 (1949), citing cases.
S 257 Pa. 478, 101 A. 807 (1917).
4 136 Pa. 628, 20 A. 567 (1890).
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formance, whereas te latter is a statement of the purpose or wish of the maker
as it exists at the time and subject to change by him, Williams, J. continued as
follows:
"Although these instruments are so unlike, they may be, and sometimes are combined so as to give a testamentary character to what purports to be a contract, or to convert a will into an irrevocable agreement."
Contract To Devise
Johnson v. McCue5
In the titled case a grandfather, desirous of retaining the company and
services of a grandson, agreed to devise sixty acres of land to the grandson, the
latter in turn agreeing to pay the former and his wife, during their joint lives a
stated sum of money annually. The grandfather executed a will making the
devise and on the same date the grandson executed and delivered his obligation
for the annual payments by instrument in writing under hand and seal. The
grandson entered into possession and later made the annual payments until his
death unmarried and without issue. The grandfather surviving refused tender
of the annual payments from the heirs of thL grandson and made another will,
revoking the earlier one, thus repudiating the original transaction. Upon his
death and probate of the later will, revoking the former one, an ejectment was
brought by the heirs of the grandson against the devisees of the grandfather. The
court instructed the jury that the will and agreement constituted a contract between the parties, enforceable in equity and the grandfather had no power to
revoke the will, the estate vesting in the heirs of the grandson upon the grandfather's death. The defendants excepted to the charge and upon verdict and
judgment for plaintiffs, sued out a writ assigning the charge for error. In affirming the judgment, Lowrie, C. J. explained:
"The writings in this case are quite a new invention; and as is usual
in such cases, however cheap may be the single instrument, the test of its
principle must be very expensive to somebody. The principal writing
is in the form of a will, devising the land in controversy together with
other lands. At the time of its execution, the devisees, as we may call
them, executed and delivered to the devisor, in consideration thereof,
a contract under seal, by which each agreed to pay to the devisor $12.50
( a year as it is understood) and that, in case of neglect to do so, the
grant in the will should be null and void, as to the party neglecting. In
addition to these facts, it is admitted that the two papers represent one
transaction; that the devisor acknowledged and performed the arrangement so long as the devisee of this particular piece of land lived; that
he admitted him to take and hold the possession, and received from him
the sum of $12.50 a year; and that since the devisee's death it has been
regularly tendered to him and refused.
a 34 Pa. is0 (1859); McCue v. Johnson, 25 Pa. 306 (1855).
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"Wecannot therefore regard the principal writing as a will. A will
is simply a unipartite disposition of property; but this writing is part of
an arrangement and disposition that are essentially bipartite, and hence
not subject to the will of one only, and therefore not revocable like a
last will. To effectuate the intention of the writings, we must strain thebungling form of the scrivener. We must treat the two papers as one
contract, whereby one man, on consideration of the covenants of the
other, grants to that other a given estate in land to vest in possession at the
d0ath of the grantor. We treat the grant as an executed one, because otherwise the remedy would be in the Orphans' Court, 5 Harris 193, and because the parties have not raised any question about the proper forum."
In the earlier case of Brinker v.Brinker Gibson, C. J. ruled that where an
agreement to devise is shown by the terms of the will, there is a sufficient

compliance with the requirements of the statute of frauds. This case is striking
as the will was lost, allegedly destroyed by a member of the family, and consequntly the facts had to be developed by parol. In Johnson v. McCue it will be
noted the action was ejectment and in Brinker v.Brinker a bill in equity.
In Smith V. Tuit7 it was held that a paper in the form of a will, devising real
estate expressly in consideration of and as compensation for specific services to be
rendered by the devisee, may operate as a memorandum of a contract for the
sale of land sufficient to comply with the statute of frauds, and as such be
admissible in evidence during the lifetime of the testator. In this case the testator
conveyed the real estate devised and ejectment was brought by the grantee against
the devisee in possession under the terms of the devise. At trial the offer of
defendant of the will, to be followed by evidence of possession and performance
of the contract, was objected to and the objection was sustained. Later the court
instructed the jury that under the evidence the verdict should be for the plaintiff.
The jury returned a verdict as instructed and a motion for new trial having been
discharged, judgment was entered for the plaintiff. In holding the trial court
erred in rejecting the offer of proof by the defendant and reversing the judgment
with new trial awarded. Green, J. declared:
"... It has long been held that such a case is not affected by the statute
of frauds, because the terms of the agreement are put in writing, to wit,
the will, and this is a sufficient compliance with the requirements of the
statute: Brinker v. Brinker, 7 Pa. 53. The circumstance that it is not to
take effect finally, until after the testator's death, will not prevent a
specific performance during the life of the testator, if he has put the
other party to the agreement in possession of the land. This was held in
McCue v. Johnson, 25 Pa. 306, where the decree was refused only because there was no provision for possession during the life of the devisor in either the will or written contract, and no sufficient proof of a
verbal contract for such possession. But in Johnson v. McCue, 34 Pa. 180,
the same will and agreement were enforced in favor of the first devisee
6 7 Pa. 53 (1847).

7 127 Na. 341, 17 A. 906 (1889).
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against devisees by a subsequent will, on the ground that the first will and
agreement must be treated as an executed contract which the devisor was
not at liberty to disregard. It is true, in that case the stipulation of the
devisee was expressed in a written paper, but the decision of the question
as to how the will was to be regarded, was not put upon that ground; and
in Brinker v. Brinker the devisee's part of the contract was in parol,
but he was nevertheless held entitled to treat the will as a contract and not
as a will, and to have specific performance. It is true this was before our
statute of frauds was passed, but the will was held to be a sufficient writing to take the case out of the statute in any event. In McCue v. Johnson,
supra, the court said, 'In point of fact so far as the instrument by which the
conveyance is to take place, is involved, it is an executed contract on
condition to take effect at the time specified. A devise transfers the legal
estate and not an equity to be perfected by another instrument. It is
the same as if a deed had been executed to take effect in futuro, only
that the common law incident of a feoffment forbids the freehold remaining in abeyance, and a resort must therefore be had to a devise or a
conveyance under the statute of uses."
"It is dear, therefore, upon all the authorities, that the testamentary
character of the testator's agreement is not a bar to relief, as upon an
executed contract. The difficulty in regard to possession by the devisee
during the lifetime of the devisor is removed, in the present case, by the
fact that the will itself provides for a present possession to begin the day
after the will was executed."
The aforegoing cases illustrate the contract to devise which is embraced in
the will itself and is a part thereof. However, thL contract to devise may be separate
and not connected with any testamentary disposition. In Cridge's Estate, 289 Pa.
331, 137 A. 455 (1927), there is an illustration of an agreement to devise
but which was ntver carried out by the promisor and the matter was presented
to the orphans' court by the parties aggrieved in the form of a petition to compel
conveyance of the real estate in question, the promisor having died. In affirming
the decree of the court below granting specific performance, Sadler, J., explained:
"The present proceeding was instituted in the orphans' court, and
petitioner demanded specific performance of the contract of sale. It
was urged on behalf of Cridge's estate that the statute of frauds intervened, but this cannot be, for the claim presented is founded on the
written contract of sale, the only dispute being as to whether the consideration was correctly expressed. In addition the money presently payable
was paid over, actual possession of the farm was taken, and the property remained in the hands of the proposed grantees thereafter: Piati v.
Seij, 207 Pa. 614; Lord's App., 105 Pa. 451; Parry v. Miller, 247 Pa.
45; Jamison v. Dimock, 95 Pa. 52; Leap v. Leahey, 67 Pa. Super. 337.
"A careful examination of the record, reading it in light of the applicable authorities, leads us to the conclusion that the assignments of
error must be overruled."
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ContractNot To Devise
Taylor v. Mitchells
If one can contract to make a devise as has been shown by the authorities already discussed, it would seem to follow logically that the converse should be legally
possible and one may contract not to make a devise. In the titled case is an illustration of this situation. C, by an agreement under his hand and seal and for a
valuable consideration covenanted that he would not by deed, mortgage, sale,
judgment, devise or otherwise, prejudice or interfere with the rights of his
heirs at law as to their free and equal share in all his real estate, but that the same
should remain free and uncontrolled, to be divided equally among all his legal
heirs, at his decease. C later made a will wherein he devised his real estate to
certain heirs but did not include T, one of his heirs therein. T brought ejectment
to recover his interest as one of the heirs of C, claiming a one-fourth share in
the real estate under the agreement. The jury found for the plaintiff but the court
on the question of law reserved entered a judgment n.o.v. for the defendants,
which was assigned for error to the supreme court. In reversing and entering
judgment for the plaintiff, Trunkey, J. observed:
"William Carson's deed, dated 5th August 1862, is so far from
being testamentary, that it contains his covenant not to devise his real
estate. The sole question is, whether that covenant shall prevail against
his will. (After reciting the contract the learned Justice continued). The
plain meaning is, that for a valuable consideration, the covenantor agreed
to hold his real estate unincumbered, free and uncontrolled, to be divided amongst his heirs. Had he contracted, for the same consideration, to
sell his land and give possession at his death, and make provision for
conveyance, after his decease, to such persons as should be his heirs, the
intent would not be more obvious. For purpose of reaching the like end
he covenanted to stand seised to the use of his heirs." 9
Oral Contract To Devise
Hertzog v. Hertzog10
In this case it was held that in an action for breach of a parol contract for
the conveyance of land, in consideration of money paid and services rendered,
the damages are to be measured by the amount of the consideration, and not by
the value of the land. The trial court charged the jury, inter alia, as follows:
"If the jury should be satisfied from this, that the old man declared
his intention to bequeath this land to John, and held this as an inducement for him to contribute to the acquisition of the estate, and he did so,
and he afterwards disappointed the hopes of the expectant devisee, by
dying without any testamentary disposition of his property, then we say
to you, that the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the estate of the de8 87 Pa. 518 (1878).
9 This case cited with approval, In re Kocher's Estate, 354 Pa. 81, 46 A.2d 488 (1946), per
Stern, J. See also VanMeter v. Norris, 318 Pa. 157, 177 A. 799 (1935).

10 34 Pa. 418 (1859).
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fendant, any amount which he can show was contributed towards the
purchase, with interest from the death of the defendant."
To this charge plaintiff excepted. A verdict and judgment having been
rendered in plaintiff's favor, he removed the case to the supreme court, assigning the quoted charge for error.
In affirming the judgment Woodward, J. declared:
"The omission from our statute of frauds and perjuries, of the 4th
section of the British statute, after which ours was modelled, left us free
to sue on parol contracts for the sale of lands. But such actions were
rare in the early history of our jurisprudence; and when they were
brought, the measure of damages, though not very distinctly defined
in the cases, was so controlled, that specific performance of the contract
should not be virtually enforced. It is too manifest for debate, that if the
value of the land may be recovered in an action of case upon the parol
contract, the statute, as we have it, is effectually evaded, as if the land
its'elf were recovered in ejectment.""1
This reasoning has been followed in other types of the same general class
of cases as for instance in Redditt v. Horn12 where Jones, J. cited the Herizog case
and observed that suit of the specific performance of an oral agreement concerning lands can be maintained only in circumstances giving rise to equities
sufficient of themselves to take the case out of the statute of frauds.
In Re Byrne's Estate"8 Baldrige, Judge, explained:
"There is no dispute over the proposition that an oral agreement
to give land as compensation for services to be rendered is enforceable
only if it is followed by exclusive possession of the land and the making of improvements which cannot be adequately compensated in damages. Morrish et al v. Price et ux., 293 Pa. 169, 142 A. 137."
Oral Contract To Bequeath
Graham v. Graham's Exrs."4
It is now well settled law that an oral contract to bequtath in general terms
is unenforceable as such against the estate of the deceased promissor although
such contract does not come within the terms of our statute of frauds. The
titled case, occurring a century ago, is typical of many found in the reports.
An aged farmer of some mans and having an invalid wife, proposed to a
young niece and her sister that they should come and live with the uncle and
aunt performing domestic services, including care of the invalid aunt. Said
the uncle, in substance: that if these nieces would go and live with him till his
death, he would "give to each as much as any relation on earth." A witness stated
11 Jack v. McKee, 9 Pa. 235 and kindred cases were overruled. The opinion of Woodward, J.
in the Hertzog case gives the history of the dialectical combat between Woodward and Rogers.
J. J. Ct. ii Dicm. L. REv. 171 (1907) ; 55 DIcK. L. REv. 96 (1951).
12 361 Pa. 533, 64 A.2d 809 (1949).
Is 122 Pa. Super. 413, 186 A. 187 (1936).
14 34 Pa. 475 (1859).
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as follows: "He said, if they would go with him, he would give them, at his
death, as much as any relation he had on earth." At the death of the uncle an
action in assumpsit was brought by one of the nieces against the executors of
the uncle to recover damages for the breach of an alleged parol contract by
the decedent to give her, in consideration of services rendered, a portion of his
estate, at his decease. At the trial the plaintiff offered to prove the value of
the testator's estate and the shares thereof taken by his nephews under his will,
for the purpose of showing the measure of her damages. To this offer the defendants objected, contending the measure of damages was the value of the
services rendered, and was not to be governed by the amount of the testator's estate.
Williams, J. (later of the supreme court) sustained the objection, holding
the alleged contract vague and uncertain but allowing recovery for any services
performed and upon the basis of reasonable compensation therefor, observing:
"If they cannot have specific performance of the promise, or such
damages as would be equivalent thereto, they are entitled to such
damages as will fully compensate them for all the services actually rendered."
To this opinion the plaintiff excepted and a verdict and judgment having been
rendered for the plaintiff for $296., she removed the cause to the supreme court
and assigned the ruling for error. In affirming the judgment Strong, J., inter
alia, reasoned:
"The temptation to set up claims against the 'estates of decedents,
particularly such decedents as have left no lineal heirs, is very great.
. . . Such claims are always dangerous, and when they rest upon parol
evidence, they should be strictly scanned. Especially, when an attempt is
made, under cover of a parol contract, to effect a distribution different

from that which the law makes, or that which the decedent has directed
by his will, should it meet with no favor in a court of law. (After reviewing the evidence the learned Justice concluded). So far is this
testimony from amounting to clear, direct, and positive proof of a contract, definite and certain, that it leaves it extremely doubtful whether
any contract was intended: whether anything more was held out or underBut, at all events, the
stood than encouragement to expect a legacy ....
contract, if any, is too uncertain to admit of enforcement. How much did
the decedent promise to give? The amount is uncertain, and, from
the nature of the arrangement, is incapable of being rendered certain.
...But without pressing the insufficiency of the proof of the contract
even if it were definite and certain, it by no means follows that the
measure of damages, in an action for its breach, is the value of the
thing promised at the time of the breach .... This case, indeed, is not
affected by the statute of frauds, but if the measure of damages must

be what is contended for by the plaintiff, what less is the result than the
establishment of a parol will?"' 15

15 The general result in this case has been followed and the case itself repeatedly cited. The

above excerpts in the main represent the present attitude of our appellate courts. For a typical
expression of attitude toward claims against estates for personal services resting on parol testimony,
Monson's Estate, 160 Pa. Super. 631, 53 A.2d 909 (1947).
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In Cramer V. McKinney 6 Stearne, J., inan excellent summary of this dass
of cases, declared:
"Where a contract to will the whole or part of an estate has bfen
proven, and a breach shown, the measure of damages is the value of the
services rendered, and not the estate promised to be given: Graham v.
Graham's Exrs., 34 Pa. 475; Neal's Ex'rs. v. Gilmore, 79 Pa. 421;
Kauss v. Rohner, 172 Pa. 481, 33 A. 1016, 51 Am. St. Rep. 762; Byrnes
Estate, 122 Pa. Super. Ct. 413, 186 A. 187."
As conducive to clear legal reasoning and consequent accurate pleading
and precise proofs, the contract to will cases, involving the estate promised for
the services performed, must be kept clear from the personal service cases based
upon no express promise, but on the promise implied in law, that is on the
quantum meruit. Bemis v. VanPelt'7 is an example wherein Judge Rhodes
has presented a well reasoned opinion, pointing out, quoting Moschzisker, J.:1'
"Unless, by amendment or otherwise, there is a clear averment in
the statement of claim showing a plain intention to plant plaintiff's
case on a pure quantum meruit basis, the rule (correctly set forth
by Judge Landis in Wolf v. Yeager's Ex'rs., 20 Lancaster Law Rev. 67)
controls that, where one claims on an express contract to pay a fixed
compensation, he cannot, on failure to prove the contract, entitle himself to recover by proving simply the value of services rendered, without
showing an actual promise to pay."' 9
From the aforegoing cases and the excerpts from the several opinions, it
is apparent the courts have adhered quite closely to the views expressed in the
early decisions. In Re Roberts' Estate,20 Stearne, J., declared:
"Claims against a decedent's estate for wages for personal services, where it is alleged that the same are to be paid for by testamentary
provision, must be examined with great care."
joint, Mutual and Reciprocal Wills
The various wills acts inPennsylvania have never laid down any required
form of testamentary disposition and it is, therefore, trite law that testators
may adopt any form deemed desirable provided the language used indicates the
wishes of the writer concerning the disposition of his property at death, meantime having thu right to revoke the testamentary instrument. It has already
been pointed out that a property owner may contract either to make or not to
make a will. The contract may be extraneous or embodied in the will. There is a
series of cases in the reports called joint, mutual and reciprocal wills where it
has been contended, sometimes with success, that these particular types of
355 Pa. 202, 49 A.2d 374 (1946); aced. Jones' Estate, 359 Pa. 26, 50 A.2d 50 (1948); Stichler's
Estate, 359 Pa. 262, 59 A.2d 51 (1948). These were all oral contract cases.
17 139 Pa. Super. 282, 11 A.2d 499 (1940).
is Witten v. Stout, Ex'r., 284 Pa. at page 412, 131 A. at page 361 (1925).
1% Cramer v. McKinney, note 16; Conti Co. v. Donovan, 358 Pa. 566, 57 A.2d 872 (1948), aced,
10 350 Pa. 467, 39 Aad 592 (1944).
16
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wills disclose intrinsically a contractual situation and by reason thereof not the
subject of revocation by the testator.
Cawley's Estate21
Benjamin and Mary Cawley were brother and sister, each of advanced age,
unmarried, and having lived together for many years. Each owned a certain amount
of property, real and personal. Instead of each making a separate will they both
joined in one testamentary paper. Benjamin died August 12, 1887, and the paper
was admitted to probate as his last will. On January 29, 1888 Mary died and
the same paper was again admitted to probate, this time as the will of Mary. Later
a paper was offered for probate executed by Mary bearing date September 5,
1887, revoking all prior wills. Which was the last will of Mary? The register
sustained the first paper after a rehearing. From this decree an appeal was taken to
the orphans' court, which reversed the register. Bucher, P. J. thus reasoned:
"Now, in the present case, even if the estate of Mary is liable upon
an enforceable contract, it does not follow that the joint will must stand
as her true will, and the subsequent will offered for probate be rejected,
but the contrary is true. We cannot take a short cut by refusing the
probate of the second will, and say that the joint will shall stand as
Mary's will and thus dispose of the whole case.22 But there is no
evidence dehors the joint will itself to establish a contractual relation
between these parties, and the joint will per se does not point to
any contract; and, regarding the joint will as the separate will of each,
there was nothing to prevent Mary from revoking her first will as she
has in fact done."
The supreme court affirmed the decree of the lower court, Williams, J. declaring there was no contract involved as shown by the evidence or the joint
or double will itself.
McGinley's Estate2t
A husband and wife had made mutual wills dated May 22, 1914. The
husband died September 9, 1914, survived by the wife. On April 6, 1915 the
wife executed a second will, revoking the previous one. On death of the wife
the later will was admitted to probate. Upon appeal to the orphans' court, an issue
was prayed for on three points, (1) lack of testamentary capacity, (2) undue
influence and (3) that the will as in violation of contract between the husband
and wife and the appellants as evidenced by the mutual wills of the husband and
wife. The prayer was denied on all three points but on appeal the decree was
reversed as to the third point. Said Mestrezat, J.:
"We cannot assent to the learned judge's conclusion that the oral
evidence submitted in conjunction with the wills of May 22, 1914,
23 136 Pa. 628, 20 A. 567 (1890); for sequel see Cawley's Ftate, 162 Pa. 320, 29 A. 701 (1894).
s "he new will might violate the contract but it is nevertheless a ralid will and can be lrobstedNowu" 29 Pa. 4 3, (,.Mg)-." Bar y, 2354, 169 Am. Law Rep. l.12,r,A 2A ; 4.
ve Ncij
28 217 N. 478, 101 A, 807 (1917).
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was insufficient to justify the court in granting an issue to determine
whether the parties entered into the agreement as alleged by the contestants .... It is well settled that one may enter into a valid contract
to dispose by will of his property, real or personal, in a particular way,
and that such will is irrevocable and the contract will be specifically
enforced."
Concerning the course of procedure the learned justice concluded:
"This proceeding was conducted by the parties, and the question
as to the validity of the alleged contract was determined by the court
below on the theory that the contract, if valid, could be set up to defeat
the probate of the will of 1915. In conformity with our practice, we
have disposed of the appeal in like manner, and, hence, it is sufficient
to say that we think the evidence justifies awarding an issue to determine
whether an irrevocable contract was made between the parties as alleged
by the contestants." 2' 4
From the Cawley and McGinley cases the principle appears that the joint
or mutual wills may or may not support the construction of a contract depending
upon the language of the wills coupled with the evidence of the surrounding
circumstances. In the former case the facts supporting the contract theory were
absent, whereas in the latter there was sufficient proof to send the case to tlt
jury. In the later cases of Hofjert's Estate 5 and Rhodes Estate28 the ruling of
the Cawley case was followed. Said Walling, J. in Rhodes Estate:
"A clear contract between husband and wife must appear to deprive
the latter of her rights under the law in their joint estate or in that of
the former. The instant case is similar to Hoffert's Est., 65 Pa. Superior
Ct. 515 where, under like conditions, it is held a joint will made by
husband and wife did not prevent the surviving husband from making
a different testamentary disposition of his estate. And while Cawley's
Est., 136 Pa. 628, is not directly in point, it tends to support the decree
here appealed from; and see Wright's Est., 155 Pa. 64."
7

Gredler's Estate
The facts of this case are interesting and unique. A husband and wife by
their joint efforts accumulated a quantity of real and personal property, the title
of which was held by-them as tenants by the entireties. They consulted a lawyer
concerning a testamentary disposition of their joint estate and mutually agreed
in the presence of the lawyer that the survivor should provide by will for distribution of thm joint estate after the survivor's death to the Catholic Church and
its institutions. They were advised that it was not necessary to make a will in
Est., 12 D. & C. at p. 95 (1920) ; for helpful classification of this type of will
by Judge Stearne of Phila. 0. C., now Stearne, J. of the supreme court. See Cridge's Est., 289 Pa.
331, 137 A. 453 (1927) as to proofs to comply with Statute of Frauds; Shroyer v. Smith, 204 Pa.
24 See Dewee's

310, 54 A. 24 (1903).

26 65 Pa. Super. 513 (1917).
26 277 Pa.450 (1923).

27 361 Pa. 384, 63 A.2d 404 (1949).
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view of the entireties estate but that the agreement entered into by them would
be sufficient. This agreement was not in writing and it gave considerable freedom
in the matter of just what institutions of the Church should benefit, leaving these
details to the discretion of the survivor. The husband died but left no will
and sometime later the wife consulted the same lawyer concerning the making
of a will to carry out the agreement between the husband and wife. Certain institutions were selected and the entire residuary estate distributed. Some years
later the wife made a second will in which substantially the same bequeaths were
made but the particular charities were changed. The testatrix died within 30
days thereafter and the question before the court was stated by Stearne, J. thus:
"The question then arises: Where there was thus on the part of
the testatrix a contractual obli ation to will property to certain beneficiaries, was the devise made In performance of such obligation void
by reason of her death within thirty days from the execution of her
will?"
The lower court, Waite, P. J., of the Orphans' Court of Erie County, answered
the question in the negative and this was affirmed by the supreme court.
After reviiewing the facts the learned Justice took up the discussion of
the law and cited Hoffner's Estate 8 and as the present case fell under the provisions of the Wills Act of 191729 the holding was in accordance with the Hoffner
case that the later will although technically within the 30-day provision concerning charities nevertheless was not affected by this provision as the will was the
carrying out of a contractual obligation.
Another interesting phase of the facts of the Gredler case was brought
up by the learned Justice in the citation of Moffitt v. Moffitt" ° applying the law
of oral trusts. Under this doctrine although the contract between the husband
and wife was not in writing nevertheless as an oral trust it would be enforceable
despite the provisions of the statute of frauds relating to real property. Emphasis was also placed upon the general principle of law that an agreement
to make a will or to devise one's property to a particular person or for a particular
purpose is binding and irrevocable when supported by what the law regards as
valid consideration.
Statute Of Frauds
As indicated in this review the restrictive provisions of the statute of
frauds play an important part in the matter of contracts to devise, nonetheless the
cases show a liberality in application of the principles in keeping with the protection of the estates of the dead. The liberality is illustrated by McGinley's &tates
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and Cridge's Estate82 in the admission of contemporaneous oral testimony to
supplement the writing and on the other hand the restrictive rulings in Craig's
Estate 8 and in Byrne's Estate8 ' establish certain judicial limitations. In the Craig
case it was stated that a binding promise to make a will in favor of a particular
person is valid, if it is based upon a sufficient consideration and is duly proved,
but the proof must be direct and positive and its terms must be definite and
certain. Furthermore, where two separate and distinct contracts, with separate
and distinct considerations supporting them, either express or implied, are
contained in the same paper, one may be enforced if it is legal, though tht other
is invalid. The reverse is true if the contract in the paper is an indivisible one.
Simpson, J. also opined:
"The mere fact of a promise to make a will in appellant's favor
would not be sufficient; it would have to appear that testator also
expressly agreed not to revoke it, or that the character of the transaction
was such that an agreement -to that effect must necessarily be implied
therefrom. The record in this case fails to disclose any such evidence."
The reverse situation concerning the statute of frauds referred to in CrAig's
Estate, supra, was exemplified in the Byrne case where it was held that the contract being entire and part is within the statute it is unenforceable as a whole,
and no action can be maintained to enforce the part which would not have been
affected by the statute if it had been separate and distinct from the other part3, s
Consequently the rule was applicable that the measure of damages for breach of
agreement to will property in consideration of services to be rendered is the value
of the services performed on faith of the contract rather than tht value of the
property promised. In this case the agreement was oral and involved both real
and personal estate of the decedent.
Measure Of Damages
The present article closes with a short study of the damage rules. In the
.matter of real estate contracts, if in writing sufficient to satisfy the statute of
frauds, the vendee may have specific performance, but if he wants damages all
that he can claim is what he expended on tht faith of the contract and this
rule applies to both oral and written contracts. In other words although the vendee
may get specific performance he cannot in damages get the value of the bargain. s
On the other hand whether the contract is oral or written the vendor can claim the
value of the bargain as against the vendee.8 7
Applying these rules to contracts to devise, the devisee or the promisee of
a contract to devise, if the stature terms are met, may have specific performance
82 289 Pa. 331, 137 A. 455 (1927).
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but in damages, either on an oral or written contract, he cannot get more than
the amount expended. 38
If the property involved is personal then the statute not applying the rule
of damages is not affected by the contract for a legacy being tither oral or in
writing.
In the contract to make bequests and legacies the action being upon an express contract many of the cases are determined upon whether the contract,
although express in terms, is sufficiently definite and certain as to what is being
bequeathed. This problem came up in the case of Graham v. Grabam's Ex'rs.39
and it was determined that the bequest was not sufficiently definite or certain.
The same problem arose in Thompson v. Stevens" wherein a judgment of the
lower court was affirmed. In the course of his opinion Sharswood, J. said:
". , . As our brother Williams said, in his opinion below, which
was affirmed in this court: 'The testator did not intimate what or how
much he would give to any relative he had on earth.' Who could say how
much that would be? It depended on his own will, as if a man were to say,
I will give you for these services just what I choose. In the case now
before us, however, the contract as proved by Elizabeth Sheaf, and confirmed by the testimony of other witnesses, was, that 'if she (the plaintiff) would stay with him (the testator) as long as hL lived, he would
provide and give her full and plenty after he was gone, so that she need
not to work.' Now, certainly, here is a measure by which the amount can
be ascertained and which brings the case within tht rule of
certainty to a common intent. Consideration being had of the condition in life of the plaintiff, what annuity would place her in

such circumstances that she need not work? The annuity tabtes settle what
such an annuity is worth or can be bought for. It is true, that this mode

of arriving at the plaintiff's compensation does not appear to have been
pursued on the trial below, but it was left to the jury generally. The
supervisory power of the court over the verdict must be resorted to where
the amount found is more than was reasonable under the circumstances.
We see no error in the manner in which the plaintiff's right of recovery
under the alleged express contract was submitted to the jury."
Likewise in Elwood's Estate4l in affirming the decree of the court below,

Schaffer, J. explained:
". . . As claimant is asking only the amount specified in the will, we
need not determine the value of her services. She accepts the figure which

the deceased himself fixed. Since the contract or agreement between the
parties was that the service rendered the decedent at his request should
be compensated by a money legacy, which under the testimony has been

made definite in amount, that sum may be recovered. Nusbaum's Estate,
a8 Hertzog v. Hertzog, 34 Pa. 418 (1859)

Graham v. Graham's Exrs., 34 Pa. 475 (1859).

19 For discussion of this case see Note 14.

40 71 Pa. 161 (1872).

41 309 Pa. 505, 164 A. 617 (1932). Accd. Fondelier v. Ridde, 152 Pa. Super. 586, 33 A.2d (1943)
86, per Baldrige, J.
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101 Pa. Super. Ct. 17; Miller's Estate, 136 Pa. 239, 20 A. 796; Thompson v. Stevens, 71 Pa. 161. This is not a case of mere hope for, or
of services rendered solely in expectation of, a legacy. On the contrary the
claim is based on a definite, uncontradicted request on the part of the
decedent for the services of the claimant and her acceptance and loyal
performance of her duties under it. Such a contract is capable of enforcement, since its terms are definite and clear, and established by direct and uncontroverted evidence. Calvert v. Eberly, 302 Pa. 152, 153 A.
146; Schleich's Estate, 286 Pa. 578, 134 A. 442; Mack's Estate, 278 Pa.
426, 123 A. 562."
If as already indicated the contract is oral, indivisible and affecting both
real and personal property, the final result in a claim against the estate of a decedent for services rendered decedent may be that the claim will have to be
based upon a quantum meruit instead of upon the express contract. In Bemis
v. VanPelt42 the decedent being ill proposed to the claimants that if they would
take care of the decedent during the balance of his life preparing his meals,
doing his housework and caring for and assisting him, he would at the time
of his death in consideration thereof give to claimants all his real estate, specifying
the same, and in addition thereto he would give them some money besides.
The contract being oral was not enforceable as to the real estate and as to the
personal property the bequest was indefinite and uncertain. Consequently, the
judgment was reversed with a venire in order that the lower court could at a
new trial correct its error in the confusion of express contract and the recovery on
quantum meruit.' 8
In Byrne's Etate"4 the claimant was denied a recovery against the estate of
a decedent for services rendered pursuant to an alleged oral contract on three
grounds, (1) that the oral agreement was unenforceable under the Statute of
Frauds of March 21, 1772, 1 Smith's Laws page 389, 33 P.S. Section 1, as
against the real estate of the decedent, and (2) that the contract for personal
services had not been sufficiently proved so as to be a claim against the per.
sonal property, and (3) for the reason that the contract allkged being an
entire one and therefore not divisible and part being within the statute of frauds,
this rendered the contract as to the personal estate unenforceable. However,
the court below did allow the claimant a certain sum approximating $560.00 for
services rendered the decedent for a period of 56 weeks at $10.00 per week,
these services having been rendered to the decedent on the faith of the alleged
agreement.
The present attitude 9 f our supreme court to the personal service cases involved in the present discussion is reflected in Jones' Estate4 and Stichler'sEstate"
42 139 Pa. Super. 282, 11 A.2d 499 (1950).

48 See note 17.

44 122 Pa. Super. 413, 186 A. 187 (1936).
45 350 Pa. 260, 59 A.2d 50 (1948).
46 350 Pa. 262, 59 A.2d 51 (1948).
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requiring in an oral contract evidence more specific than a statement as alleged
by the decedent to give his entire estate or a part thereof to the claimant in consideration of services. These alleged contracts apparently should be in writing
signed by the decedent or if wholly proved by oral evidence should be based upon
a specific and definite claim, or in other words a claim for a certain portion of
the estate either as indicated by the Intestate Laws or by some specific amount
of money or property. Otherwise the measure of damages if47 the claimant is to
recover at all is based on the value of the services rendered.
47 See Article, Damages for Services Rendered in Reliance on Promise to Devise Unpeftormed,
S DzcK. L. RBV. 212 (1949).

